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Abstract
In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy
macroeconomics, the paper shows that a centralized wage setting (CWS)
and central bank conservatism (CBC) curb unemployment only if labor
market distortions are sizeable. When labor distortions are su¢ ciently
low, employment may be maximized by atomistic wage setters or a pop-
ulist CB. The comparison between the national monetary policy (NMP)
regime and the monetary union (MU) reveals that a move to a MU boosts
ination in the absence of strategic e¤ects. However, when strategic inter-
actions between CB(s) and trade unions are taken into account, the shift to
a MU unambiguously increases welfare and employment when monopoly
distortions are sizeable either in presence of a su¢ ciently conservative CB
or with fully CWS. Conversely, when labor market distortions are less rel-
evant, the paper shows that an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters
are optimal for the society and a shift to a MU regime is unambiguously
welfare improving.
JEL classication : E2, E42, E5, F31, F41
Keywords : Central bank conservatism, centralization of wage setting,
inationary bias, monetary union.
1 Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has ruled out the pos-
sibility of using the exchange rate as a substitute for structural reforms among
the euro area member states. This implies that the costs of implementing in-
e¢ cient institutions become more apparent since the lack of nominal exchange
rate puts the burden of adjustment on labor and product markets. In this re-
spect, adjustment can be achieved through movements in the relative prices and
wages.
Compared to the case of national monetary policy (NMP), EMU should
impose less discipline on wage setters for they perceive an increase in their
wages to have a smaller impact on the union-wide ination rate relative to the
one on their country-specic ination rate. This point has been recently stressed
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in literature on strategic wage setting (e.g. Coricelli et al., 2004; Cukierman and
Lippi, 2001; Soskice and Iversen, 1998; Grüner and Hefeker, 1999).
However when countries trade with each other new issues arise from the
strategic interactions among Home and Foreign central bank (CB) and Home
and Foreign labor unions. Cuciniello (2007) shows that strategic interactions
between NMPs of two countries inuence the wage setting and, hence, the labor
market adjustment in presence of non-atomistic wage setters. This paper aims
to extend these results contributing with a study on the long run macroeco-
nomic consequences of a monetary regime shift from oating exchange rates to
a monetary union (MU).
We use a general-equilibrium model of two countries, di¤erent in size and la-
bor market institutions, characterized by monopolistic competition in the prod-
uct market and unionized labor markets. In a micro-founded framework in line
with the new open economy macroeconomics, we show that, aside from the
response of real wages to labor market conditions, the move to a MU raises
ination since it increases the common CBs temptation to resort to surprise
ination relative to national CBs. Moreover we demonstrate that welfare and
employment are unambiguously higher in a MU when monopoly distortions in
the labor market are not so relevant. By contrast, when labor market dis-
tortions are sizeable the results may be ambiguous. In particular if the CB
conservatism (CBC) is low, there exists a level of Foreign CBC that renders
welfare and employment higher under a NMP regime, while for high levels of
monetary conservatism employment and welfare are maximized in a MU.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model in a
MU regime. Section 3-6 compute the optimal strategy of each player. Section
7 analyzes the e¤ects of the number of unions and CBC on employment and
ination in the two regimes. Section 8 presents the conclusions.
2 Economic Setup
In this section we develop a general equilibrium model in a micro-founded frame-
work. The monetary union is formed by two countries, Home (H) and Foreign
(F ). The world size is normalized to 1; Home agents are indexed by numbers
in the interval [0; ], while Foreign agents reside on (; 1], where  2 (0; 1) is a
measure of relative population and economic size.
There are two types of goods in the MU, and each country is specialized in
the production of one type that, in turn, can be manufactured by a continuum of
monopolistic competitive rms in a variety of brands indexed by z 2 (0; 1). The
main feature of such a hypothesis is that the degree of substitutability between
types di¤ers from the degree of substitutability between brands.
Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied in a variety of types
dened in the continuous interval (0; 1). All labor types are unionized and
distributed equally among trade unions. For a given wage, each agent is willing
to provide whatever quantity of labor is required to clear the market.
Henceforth we will focus mainly on the domestic country so as to compare its
macroeconomic performance under a oating exchange rate (Cuciniello, 2007)
and in a MU.
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2.1 Supply side
Each rm is the sole producer of a particular brand z that is produced by using
a continuum of labor types according to the following decreasing-return-to-scale
technology
YH(z) =
Z 1
0
Li(z)
 1
 di
 
 1
; 0 <  < 1;  > 1
where YH(z) is the output of the Home brand z, Li is the labor type i,  is
the elasticity of substitution among labor types and  is representing the return
to scale parameter. Firms are assumed to have market power in the product
market but not in the labor market so that they take wages as given. Cost
minimization implies the following demand for each labor type i
Li(z) =

Wi
W
  
W
PH(z)
  11 
(1)
where
W =
Z 1
0
W 1 i di
 1
1 
is the aggregate wage index dened as the minimal nominal cost of producing a
unit of output and PH(z) is the price for a brand z charged by a domestic rm
at Home.
2.2 Preferences
Each agent consumes a continuum of di¤erentiated goods and supplies a di¤er-
entiated labor type. The agent js utility is dened over consumption and hours
worked as follows:
Uj = logCj   k
2
(logLj)
2
k > 
where k is a preference parameter1 . Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998), Cj
is an index of consumption of Home and Foreign goods (for a representative
agent) dened as follows:
Cj =
Cj;HC
1 
j;F
(1  )1 
with
Cj;H =
"
1

 1

Z 1
0
(Cj;H(z))
 1
 dz
# 
 1
;
Cj;F =
"
1
1  
 1

Z 1
0
(Cj;F (z))
 1
 dz
# 
 1
;  > 1:
1Two conditions are to be satised by the utility function. The rst is the disutility of
work (
Uj
Lj
< 0, which implies logLj > 0). The second is the concavity of the utility function
in leisure (
2Uj
L2j
=   k
L2j
(1   logLj) < 0; implying that logLj < 1). The assumption k > 
guarantees that in equilibrium 0 < logLj < 1 holds (see equation (36)).
3
It is clear that the elasticity of substitution across brands produced within a
country is 2 , while the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
goods is 1.
The optimal consumption allocation of a representative individual across the
Home and Foreign good is respectively
Cj;H = 

PH
P
 1
Cj ; Cj;F = (1  )

PF
P
 1
Cj
where
P = P HP
1 
F (2)
is the consumer price index (CPI) and
PH =

1

Z 1
0
PH(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
; PF =

1
1  
Z 1
0
PF (z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, (3)
are the Home and Foreign producers index, respectively.
2.3 Individual budget constraints
To complete the qualication of the individuals problem, we consider the agents
budget constraint. Each j-th individual draws a salary for the labor type sup-
plied to rms which, in turn, distribute dividends evenly among their owners
(all of the workers). Markets are complete domestically and international equity
trade is forbidden3 . Moreover, in order to pay for nominal expenses, cash in
advance is needed. Under these assumptions, the agents budget constraint is
given by
Mj  PCj =WjLj +Dj ; (4)
where Mj are individual js money balances, Wj is the nominal wage and
Dj are agent js dividends received by all domestic rms.
2.4 Demand side
The allocation of a representative individuals demand across the Home- and
Foreign-produced brands yields
Cj;H(z) =
1


PH(z)
PH
 
Cj;H =

PH(z)
PH
 
PH
P
 1
Cj ; (5)
Cj;F (z) =
1
1  

PF (z)
PF
 
Cj;F =

PF (z)
PF
 
PF
P
 1
Cj (6)
where PH(z) and PF (z) are the prices for a brand z charged by a domestic and
foreign rm at Home, respectively4 . The law of one price is assumed to hold
2The parameter  is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The inequality
constraint ensures an interior equilibrium with a positive level of output. This relationship
will become apparent later when we solve for the optimal price setting.
3However, securities markets are redundant in this model so as current accounts always
balance in equilibrium (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1998).
4Recall that  > 1 captures the elasticity of substitution among varieties, while the elas-
ticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign good is equal to 1.
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across all individual brands, so that Pc(z) = P c (z), 8z 2 [0; 1], where asterisks
denote Foreign values of the corresponding Home variables, and c 2 [H;F ] :
Moreover, because Home and Foreign agents have identical preferences, the law
of one price implies that purchasing power parity must hold for the consumer
price indexes:
P = P :
Thus integrating the demand for a Home-produced brand (5) and Foreign-
produced brand (6) across all agents yields the total demand faced by a rm
z:
Yc(z) =

Pc(z)
Pc
 
Pc
P
 1
CW (7)
where CW  C+(1 )C is the total consumption in the world economy, C 
1

R 
0
Cjdj is the per capita consumption of a Home agent and C
  11 
R 1

Cjdj
is the per capita consumption of a Foreign resident5 .
The goods-market-clearing condition implies that total output demands equal
supplies, i.e.

h
PC + (1  )PC
i
= PHYH (8)
(1  )
h
PC + (1  )PC
i
= PFYF (9)
where YH 
R 1
0
YH(z)dz and YF 
R 1
0
YF (z)dz. From equation (8) and (9) we
can derive the following expression:
PHY H = PFY F (10)
where Y H  1
R 1
0
YH(z)dz and Y F  11 
R 1
0
YF (z)dz. Relation (10), together
with the assumption that agents do not hold international assets, implies that
current accounts always are zero (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1998) and that
CW = C = C

:6 (11)
Let MH 
R 
0
Mjdj and MF 
R 1

Mjdj be the total money supply in the
Home and Foreign country, respectively. We assume that total money supply
in the monetary union is distributed across the two regions according to the
country size as follows
MU =M

HM
1 
F : (12)
Normalizing the previous period nominal money supply, the current nominal
money supplies can be expressed as
MU = 1 +mU
where mU  logMU stands for percentage increases.
5Note that CW is both per capita and total world consumption.
6This can be easily proved by using the relation (10) into the individual budget constraint
as follows:
C =
PHY H
P
; C

=
PFY F
P
:
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Finally, using equation (11), (8) and the cash in advance hypothesis, the
aggregate-nominal demand (7) in the domestic country can be rewritten as
PHYH 
Z 1
0
PH(z)YH(z)dz =MH : (13)
Likewise in the Foreign country the aggregate nominal demand is proportional
to money supply
PFYF 
Z 1
0
PF (z)YF (z)dz =MF : (14)
2.5 Unions
The Home country is populated by a nite number of unions, nH . Since all
labor types are unionized and equally distributed among unions, each union
has mass 1nH . In our setup the degree of centralization of wage setting (CWS)
is equal to union size so that the smaller is the number of unions, the more
relevant is the impact of their wage settlement on aggregate variables. In this
respect the CWS is directly related to the unionscapacity to internalize the
macroeconomic consequences of wage variations7 .
The representative union is benevolent, i.e. it maximizes the utility of its
members under the workersbudget constraint (4):
Vi = nH
Z
j2i
Ujdj: (15)
We assume that each worker (and the union that represents her) takes prots
as given8 . The Home union sets the same rate of growth of the nominal wage !i
among its members so as to maximize its own objective function. It is convenient
to express the nominal wage of worker i, Wi; and the CPI in the Home country
as
Wi = 1 + !i ; P = 1 + ;
where  is domestic ination rate9 .
The benevolent union hypothesis is in line with the trade union behavior
surveyed by Oswald (1982) whose objective function usually includes real wages
and unemployment10 .
2.6 Central Bank
Drawing on the literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy, we assume
that the monetary authority is ination averse and cares about the real perfor-
7Drawing on Guzzo and Velasco (1999) we refer to such capacity as internalization e¤ ect.
8Aside from monopoly power, this adds an other distortion introduced in the model. Con-
versely, when we present the CB problem below, the CB will allow for all economy-wide
interactions so as to internalize the e¤ect of D on the welfare of agents.
9The previous period of nominal wage and ination are nomalized to unity without loss of
generality since equilibrium outcome does not depend on it.
10Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Soskice and Inversen (2001), Cukierman and Lippi (2001)
evaluate the macroeconomic e¤ect of monetary unication when unions are averse to ination.
However we focus on microeconomic instead of macroeconomic foundations to analyze unions
behavior.
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mance in the economy, which in our setup corresponds to agentsutility11 .
We draw on Lippi (2003) and assume that the common CB aims at maxi-
mizing the following targeting rule:

U =
Z 1
0
Ujdj   U
2
2 U  0: (16)
The parameter U is the CBs degree of conservatism (Rogo¤, 1985a). If the
level of conservatism is zero the CB becomes a benevolent planner who cares
only about the agentswelfare.
2.7 Timing structure of the model
In the rst stage (at time 1), each union chooses the rate of growth of the
nominal wage of its members in a simultaneous game with Foreign and the
other domestic unions so as to maximize its objective function (15). Moreover,
in the maximization problem each union anticipates the reaction of the CB and
of rms to its wage choice. The timing sequence is built on the notion that
nominal wages are substantially more sticky than prices and monetary policy.
The rationale for such an assumption is that workers are normally under contract
for at least a year; thus, wage setters are committed to the bargained wage over
the whole period of the game.
In the second stage (at time 2) the common CB sets the money supply
taking as given the preset nominal wages and internalizing the reaction of rms.
Monetary policy is hence stickier than price setting12 .
In the last stage (at time 3) each monopolistic competitive rm sets the
price of its own brand so as to maximize its prot, taking the general price
level, nominal wages and money supply as given13 .
The three-stage game between rms, the monetary authority and labor
unions is solved by backward induction so as to nd the Nash sub-game perfect
equilibrium.
3 Price setting
In the last stage of game each domestic rm maximizes its own prots solving
the following problem:
max
PH(z)
D(z) = PH(z)YH(z) 
Z 1
0
WiLi(z)di (17)
s. to
Z 1
0
WiLi(z)di = WYH(z)
1
 and YH(z) =

PH(z)
PH
 
PH
P
 1
CW .
11The paper investigates how the design of the monetary institution a¤ects the country
performance. The notion of an ination averse CB may be interpreted also as a kind of
general institutional constraint in the economy.
12Models with a New Keynesian orientation à la Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) suppose
that price setters move rst than the monetary authority. However, the assumption of prices
stickiness is more debatable than wages stickiness (see Cukierman, 2004).
13Notice that the timing of the game implies no precommitment of the CB. Monetary policy
is hence set in a "discretionary" way. Moreover since rms are the last to move, prices may
be considered as fully exible.
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The rst constraint stems from the cost minimization problem of rms. The
second one is the result of the consumer problem derived previously. Solving
(17) for the optimal relative price of rm z, we obtains after some algebra14 :
PH(z)
PH
=
"

(  1)
W
P

PH
P
  1 MU
P
 1 

# 
+(1 )
:
As in the closed economy literature, the price rule is an increasing function of
the real wage and real money balances. However here two further e¤ects are
at work. First, the terms of trade captured by the ratio between the Home
producers index and the CPI. An increase in the price of Home-produced good
improves the terms of trade but reduces the optimal relative price. This is due to
the loss of competitiveness of the Home-produced good and the following shift
in the demand. Consumers in both countries switch, in fact, from the more
expensive Home good to the cheaper Foreign one inducing rm to decrease
their own brand price in order to keep out of reduction in sales. Second, the
aggregate demand includes also the real balance e¤ect emanating from the other
country. An increase in Foreign money supply, in fact, boosts consumption both
for Foreign and domestic products.
In a symmetric equilibrium the price of a brand, Pc(z), coincides with the
producer price index, Pc, for all z. Thus taking the logarithms of each rst
order condition of Home rms yields15
H    = (!   ) + (1  )(mU   ) (18)
This relation shows that, although prices are fully exible, they do not com-
pletely move when the money supply changes. As a matter of fact, it is not
optimal for prot maximizing rms to respond exactly in kind to the money
supply as long as nominal wages have not been changed. This implies that the
monetary authority may a¤ect real variables, even when prices are fully exible,
for nominal wages are contractually xed (Cukierman, 2004).
Arranging equation (18), we obtain the following negative relation between
real money balances and wages:
mU   H =   
1   (!   H) (19)
From the denition of the CPI (2), the previous equations imply that the
general price level can be rewritten in terms of Home and Foreign wages and
money supplies as follows:
 = (1  )mU + !U (20)
where !U  ! + (1  )!:
An accommodating monetary policy operates in a country through the ex-
pansion of the demand faced by each monopolistic rm boosting in this way
the ination rate. At this stage Home and Foreign wages a¤ect ination in the
country only through their impact on input costs which in turn determine Home
and Foreign good prices, respectively. In the following sections we will see that
the monetary policy is also inuenced by Home and Foreign wage settlements
through strategic interactions.
14Coricelli et al. (2000) introduced for the rst time the optimal price setting in the litera-
ture on nominal wage bargaining systems.
15 In deriving the following expression, we neglect the costant  log 
( 1) .
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4 Ination-employment trade-o¤
This section explains how a move from a NMP regime, i.e. a setup where each
country has its own CB setting the money supply, to a MU may a¤ect the
trade-o¤ between ination and employment for the CB. Henceforth we base the
comparison on the results obtained under a NMP regime in Cuciniello (2007).
In setting its optimal monetary policy the CB faces a trade-o¤ between
ination and employment. Since all rms have the same reaction function, the
demand for labor type i (1) becomes
Li;c =

Wi;c
Wc
  
Wc
Pc
  11 
; c 2 [H;F ] : (21)
Then taking logs and plugging equation (18) into equation (21) yields
li;c  logLi;c =  (!i;c   !c) +mU   !c: (22)
Now the MU Phillips curve is obtained by solving for money supply equation
(22) and substituting it into (20),
 = (1  )
Z 1
0
ljdj + (1  )
Z 
0
(!j   !)dj +
Z 1

(!j   !)dj

+ !U : (23)
The slope of the Phillips curve in the MU is hence
d
dlU
= 1   > 0 (24)
where lU 
R 1
0
ljdj.
It can be shown16 that under a NMP regime the slope of the Home Phillips
curve is given by,
d
dlN
= 1   > 0 (25)
where lN 
R 
0
ljdj.
It is apparent that the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the monetary
regime set up in the country as the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1 The formation of a MU produces a change in the trade-o¤ be-
tween ination and employment so that the Phillips curve is atter in the MU,
d
dlN
> ddlU :
Intuitively, the impact of money supply on aggregate employment is always
equal to one in both regimes (see equation (22)). Conversely, the general level
of price is a¤ected di¤erently by the CB in a MU and under a NMP. Under
oating exchange rates, the Home CB inuences the CPI via the producer price
index and the nominal exchange rate. In a MU this second channel is ruled
out. The Proposition 1 simply states that the two channels of the sovereign
monetary authority have a larger impact on CPI than the single channel of the
common CB in a MU.
16See Cuciniello (2007).
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5 Monetary policy
This section examines the optimization problem of the common CB under a MU
regime and how the CB responds to wage hikes. Monetary policy is decided in
the second stage of the game.
The CB chooses the union-wide money supply taking as given nominal wages
in the economy and internalizing the rms reaction function so as to maximize
(16) under the MU Phillips curve investigated in the previous section (23). In
other words, the CB acts as Stackelberg-follower player vis-à-vis trade unions
(Stackelberg leaders) and as Stackelberg-leader vis-à-vis rms (Stackelberg fol-
lowers).
The CB payo¤ (16) may be rewritten as

 = lU   k
2
l2U  
U
2
2:
Thus the rst order condition of the CB is given by17
d

dmU
=   klU   U
d
dlU
 = 0() (26)

k
  lU   U(1  )
k
= 0:
According to expression (26), as long as the employment level is below the com-
petitive one18 , k (see equation (36)), it is optimal for the CB to fuel a positive
ination rate through its monetary policy. By contrast, when employment is
above the competitive level, CB deates the general price level.
Moreover, relation (26) shows the role played by the Phillips curve in the CB
balances of unemployment and ination. The weight given to ination depends
on the degree of conservatism and the slope of the Phillips curve. As a matter
of fact, both CBC and the slope of the Phillips curve have the same function:
they determine the relative signicance attached to ination by the CB. It is
easy to see that, ceteris paribus, the e¤ect of a atter Phillips curve is similar to
the e¤ect of smaller CBC. The CB will adopt a more accommodating monetary
policy either with a smaller degree of conservatism or a atter Phillips curve.
In both cases the CB would realize a higher loss from reducing ination rather
than unemployment19 .
Using (20) and (22), we explicitly solve (26) for the money supply
mU =
+ [k   (1  )U ]!U + k
R 
0
(!i   !)di+ k
R 1

(!i   !)di
k + U (1  )2
: (27)
Drawing on Proposition 1 and equation (26), it is apparent that the mar-
ginal cost faced by the CB is lower in the MU than under a oating exchange
17Since the CB is a large agent, prots are not taken as given.
18 i.e. the level of employment that maximizes the workerswelfare equating the consump-
tion/leisure marginal rate of substitution (k logL) to the (e¢ cient) technical rate of transfor-
mation ( 1

).
19We will see below that, since the CBs reaction function is common knowledge for labor
unions, workers anticipate the incentive of the CB to inate. In the "time-consistent" equilib-
rium the marginal benet to higher ination exactly o¤sets the marginal cost. The monetary
authority could inate above and beyond the worker (rational) expectations, but it is not in
her interest to do so.
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rate regime. It follows that, ceteris paribus, the CB is encouraged to inject
more money in the monetary system so as to equate the marginal benet and
marginal cost. However, the common CB cares about MU employment that is
not necessarily equal to the Home country level.
Now from equation (27) we can investigate how the CB reacts to change in
Home and Foreign wages. The following proposition underlines the importance
of the degree of conservatism in determining the tightening or the accommoda-
tion in the monetary policy to a wage increase.
Proposition 2 For values of CBC below (above) bU = k(1 ) the CB ac-
commodates (contracts) the money supply response to Home and Foreign wage
increases.
Proof. At a symmetric equilibrium, from equation (27) we obtain dmUd!U =
k (1 )U
k+U (1 )2 whose sign depends clearly on the CBC.
A rise in wages increases both ination and employment. A conservative
CB, i.e. when U >
k
(1 ) , responds to any wage hike by tightening its money
supply since it put more weight on ination than unemployment. Conversely,
a populist CB, i.e. when U <
k
(1 ) , cares more about unemployment than
ination and so its response to wage rises is accommodating.
6 Wage setting
In this section we evaluate how wage setting is a¤ected by the a shift from a
NMP regime to a MU.
In the rst stage of the game unions act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis
the monetary authority and rms, i.e. the labor unions anticipate the reaction
functions of the CB and rms. In the Home country union i chooses the rate of
growth of the nominal wage, !i, so as to maximize (15) subject to (4) and (27).
In doing that the union takes as given prots, Di; and the nominal wages set by
the other unions at Home and abroad. The typical union i rst order condition
is hence20
(
d logWi;r
d!i
  sr   "r) + "rkli = 0; r 2 [N;U ] (28)
where sr is the impact e¤ect (elasticity) of !i on ination when the nominal
wages of other unions are taken as given in a monetary regime r 2 [N;U ]:
sN  d
d!i
=
1
nH
[ + (1  )HH   (1  )FH ] 2 (0; 1) (29)
sU  d
d!i
=

nH
[(1  )U + ] 2 (0; ) (30)
with HH (FH) representing the reduced form elasticity of Home (Foreign)
money supply to Home aggregate wages under a NMP regime, while U is
the elasticity of union-wide money supply to union-wide wages under a MU
20See the Appendix for details.
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regime21 . "r is the elasticity of labor demand to the nominal wage of union i in
the monetary regime r:
"N    dli
d!i
= 

1  1
nH

+ (1  HH)
1
nH
; (31)
"U    dli
d!i
= 

1  1
nH

+ (1  U )

nH
: (32)
Note that equation (31) and (32) are a weighted average of the elasticity of
substitution among labor types and the elasticity of aggregate labor demand.
Dividing (28) by d logWi;rd!i   sr, we can express the rst order condition in terms
of the real wage elasticity of labor demand, r, as follows
22
(1  r) + krli = 0: (33)
Equation (33) shows that an increase in the union is wages has two opposing
e¤ects on the utility of workers. On one hand it increases the real wage and
reduces employment; since the latter e¤ect is larger there is a reduction in
consumption (the rst term in (33)). On the other hand, a wage rise increases
utility through leisure (the second term in (33)). Thus, each union sets a nominal
wage growth according to its consumption/leisure preferences, k.
Under a NMP regime the elasticity of domestic labor demand (in absolute
value) is given by
N (
)  "N
1  sN =
1  cc + (nc   1)
nc   1 + c(1  cc) + (1   c) cc
2 (1;1) (34)
where H  1   and F  1  (1  ).
Similarly we may derive the labor demand elasticity in the Home and Foreign
country under a MU regime as follows
U (
)  "U
   sU =
1  U + (nH   1)
nH   1 + (1  )(1  U )
2 (1;1): (35)
It is worth noticing that when unions internalize the impact of their wages
on the CB reaction abroad, FH , such variable increases the elasticity of labor
demand23 . Intuitively, an increase in Home wages boosts the price of the Home-
produced good. The Foreign country undergoes an imported ination since it
consumes the Home good as well. Thus, the Foreign CB is induced to counteract
the inationary wage settlement with a restrictive monetary policy so as to keep
current account balance and consumption constant across the two countries (see
equation (11)).
In the next section we will see how employment and ination are determined
by macroeconomic institutional variables that a¤ect the labor demand elasticity.
In doing that we will assume that the CBC is not a¤ected by the monetary
regime, i.e. U = H = .
21See Appendix for details.
22Derivation in Appendix.
23The elasticities of money supply with respect to nominal wages abroad,  cc, are always
negative (Cuciniello, 2007).
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7 Equilibrium employment and ination
Since unions are identical, in a symmetric equilibrium li = l for all i = 1; :::; nH
we can derive employment from equation (33) as follows:
lr =

k

1  1
r

2 (0; 1): (36)
Equation (36) points out that equilibrium employment is an increasing function
of the elasticity of labor demand, r. When the elasticity of labor is nite
(r <1) unions have some market power24 . The smaller is the labor elasticity,
the higher is the unionsincentive to raise its nominal wages. In fact, a nominal
wage claim sends ripples through employment to a less extent in presence of
market power25 . By contrast, when the elasticity of labor demand goes to
innity we achieve the competitive (optimal) level of employment k .
The area-wide price level is calculated by plugging equation (36) into the
CB reaction function (26). Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the
ination rate in the two regimes as follows
N =

(1  )


N
+
1  
N

(37)
U =

 (1  )


U
+
1  
U

: (38)
It is clear that labor market characteristics play a key role in determining equi-
librium ination as well. In particular, the ination rate is negatively a¤ected
by the elasticity of labor demand. Moreover, equation (37) and (38) indicate an
ination bias. With no precommitment of any kind for the monetary authority,
this is a standard result in the literature on the time inconsistency of monetary
policies. We therefore can state that
Remark 3 The conventional wisdom that discretionary policymaking by the
CB yields an ination bias, while leaving employment at suboptimal levels, still
holds in an open economy when the elasticity of labor demand is nite.
It is crucial at this point to compare the labor demand elasticity N and U
so as to assess the impact of macroeconomic institutions on employment and
ination. Before doing that, it is worth noticing that if we assume identical
labor demand elasticity, i.e. U = N and 

U = 

N , ination is lower under a
NMP than in a MU for a given level of employment. Since the Phillips curve is
atter in a MU, the common CB has a stronger incentive to inate as long as
the employment level is below the competitive one. Non-atomistic trade unions
anticipate the reduced cost faced by the common CB in terms of ination and
demand for higher wages which, in turn, lead to higher ination.
However as shown in the Appendix, the elasticities of money supply to nom-
inal wage di¤er among the two regimes and, consequently, the labor demand
elasticity. Removing the assumption of equality renders the framework richer.
24As in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), equilibrium employment
is at suboptimal level.
25The monopolistic nature of the labor market and the e¤ects on employment are in accord
with Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) results.
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The labor market structure (i.e. the labor demand elasticity) is in fact ulti-
mately determined by the number of unions and the elasticity HH and FH ;
when the monetary policies are uncoordinated, and U with a common CB (see
equation (34) and (35)). Thus, in the following section we assess how CBC,
CWS and country size may modify the labor demand elasticity.
7.1 Role of central bank conservatism
How do employment and ination depend on the CBC? Rewriting the labor
demand elasticity with respect to the real wage as follows26
r =
r
k
sr
d logWi;r
d!i
  sr
+
nH   1
nH

d logWi;r
d!i
  sr
; (39)
where N  H  1   and U  1  .
It is clear that a higher degree of conservatism has two opposing e¤ects on
labor unions. On the one hand, a non-atomistic wage setter becomes aware of
the fact that an increase in its nominal wages causes higher ination which, in
turn, reduces employment through the CB reaction function (equation (26)).
The higher is the degree of CBC, the more severe are the employment conse-
quences of wage aggressiveness27 . Drawing on Lippi (2003) terminology we refer
to it as adverse output e¤ect.
On the other hand, since a conservative CB leads unions to perceive less the
inationary impact of their wage, they also anticipate the real wage of other
unions to decrease to a lesser extent and, hence, the shift of labor demand
towards cheaper labor types is smaller28 . This adverse competition e¤ect en-
courages wage aggressiveness (Lippi, 2003).
Now it may be interesting analyzing the two limit cases of a CB ultra-
populist and ultra-conservative. Letting the CBC go to zero, i.e. assuming that
the CB does not care about ination but only about agentsutility, we obtain
the monopolistic competition level of employment29
[l]=0 =

k

1  1


: (40)
26The elasticity of labor is obtained by substituting the CB reaction function in terms of
aggregate labor into li =  (!i   !) + l and di¤erentiating with respect to !i:
27Formally this can be seen by di¤erentiating the rst term of equation
(39) with respect to CBC: d
d

N
k
sN
1 sN

= N
k
sN
1 sN
 
1

+
dsN
d
1 sN
!
=
k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )2N
[k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )+nHF NF (F 1)+nH(k+F F )2N ]
2 > 0 where F  1  (1  ) and
F is the degree of the Foreign CBC. In a MU,
d
d

U
k
sU
1 sU

=
k(1 )(nH )
[nH (1 )2+k(nH )]2
> 0:
28Formally this can be seen by di¤erentiating the second term of equa-
tion (39) with respect to CBC: d
d

nH 1
nH

1 sN

= nH 1
nH

1 sN
dsN
d
1 sN =
  kn
2
H (k+F 
2
F )
2F [kH+F F (1 )]
(nH 1)[k(nH 1)(k+F 2F )+nHF NF (F 1)+nH(k+F F )2N ]
2 < 0 and in a MU
d
d

nH 1
nH

1 sU

=   kn
2
H (1 )2
(nH 1)[nH (1 )2+k(nH )]2
< 0:
29The values of r in the case of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB are derived in
the Appendix.
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When the CB is ultra-populist the strategic interaction channel between trade
unions and CB is halted30 . In such a case, the employment level is below the
Pareto e¢ cient one, k , and it depends on the degree of substitutability among
labor types. As specied in section 5, an ultra-populist CB accommodates any
domestic wage hike one-to-one which implies that wage setters can not a¤ect
employment.
The other extreme case of a CB that cares only about ination, i.e. an
ultra-conservative CB, yields the following equilibrium employment level under
a NMP and a MU regime respectively
lim
!1
l =

k
0@1  1
1
nH
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) +

1  1nH


1A (41)
lim
!1
l =

k
0@1  1
1
nH
1
1  +

1  1nH


1A : (42)
From the relation (40), (41) and (42), we can make the following remark.
Remark 4 (i) In the case of an ultra-populist CB, when  = 0, the labor de-
mand elasticity under a NMP regime, N , and the labor demand elasticity in a
MU, U , coincide and are equal to ; (ii) in the case of an ultra-conservative
CB, when  ! 1, the labor demand elasticity under a NMP regime, N , is
always smaller than the labor demand elasticity in a MU.
According to Remark 4, if a CB does not care about ination before and
after a move to MU, the regime shift does not have any impact on the labor
demand elasticity which is equal to the labor substitution elasticity. This is due
to the fact that when  = 0, the CB has only one target (the employment level)
which can be always achieved ruling out the strategic interaction with the labor
unions through the price level. The CB in fact accommodates any Home wage
hike one-to-one so that unions can not modify their real wage.
Notice that, under uncoordinated monetary policies, even though a domes-
tic CB does not care about ination at all, the CB abroad always counteracts
domestic wage aggressiveness with a restrictive monetary policy which, in turn,
causes a depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. This boosts ination fur-
ther and acts as a discipline e¤ect on wage claims, since a nominal wage increase
ends in a real wage improvement to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, when  = 0,
also the Foreign CB impact to domestic wages fades away. As a matter of fact,
the (negative) response of the CB abroad to a domestic wage hike is exactly
o¤set by the (positive) response induced by the expansionary money supply in
the Home country31 .
By contrast, the second part of Remark 4 states that, when a CB cares only
about ination, the labor demand elasticity is larger in a MU than under a NMP
regime. The main reason for a such result is due to the change in the slope of the
30The CB has only one target (employment) and hence the trade-o¤ between ination and
employment in its optimal monetary policy is prevented. An increase in nominal wage will
cause an equal increase in money supply. This implies that labor unions can not a¤ect their
real wages.
31Domestic and foreign money supply are strategic complements (see Cuciniello, 2007).
15
Phillips curve (see section 4). The atter Phillips curve in a MU entails that,
ceteris paribus, the CB is willing to forego a larger level of employment in order
to stabilize ination. It is worth noticing that the presence of a Foreign CB
under uncoordinated monetary policies increases the employment consequences
of domestic wage rises but Remark 4 stresses that, with an ultra-conservative
CB, the adverse output e¤ect in a MU is always larger than under a NMP
regime and, consequently, discouraging wage aggressiveness to a larger extent.
Is labor demand elasticity and, hence, macroeconomic consequences more
sizeable with a conservative or liberal CB? As the following proposition points
out, this depends on the monopolistic distortion in the factor market.
Equation (41) and (42) show that when a CB has ination as overriding
objective, the employment level may be larger or smaller than equation (40).
Thus the idea that an ultra-conservative CB can always restore e¢ ciency is
rejected. In general labor demand elasticity and, hence, the macroeconomic
consequences of a conservative CB depends on the monopolistic distortion in
the factor market as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) For a number of unions nH 2 (1;1), an increase in CBC
raises employment in a MU and under a NMP regime only if  < 11  and
 <
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) , respectively. (ii) If either nH = 1 or nH !1, the impact
of CBC on employment is nil.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As  rises, the elasticity of money supply with respect to local wages switches
from positive to negative values. Thus, an increase in CBC reduces the ina-
tionary repercussions of wage settlement and enlarges the unemployment con-
sequences (as apparent in equations (29)-(32)). Since the CBC a¤ects the rst
term (adverse output e¤ect) of the elasticity of labor demand (39) positively
and the second one (adverse competition e¤ect) negatively, the e¤ect of CBC
on the adverse output e¤ect prevails only if the condition in Proposition 5 holds.
In other words, if labor power is sizeable, i.e.  is su¢ ciently small, the i-th
union understands that ination (caused by its nominal wage rise) reduces em-
ployment by triggering a restrictive monetary policy32 . On the contrary, if 
is large, since the inationary consequences of a wage claim are kept down by
a more conservative CB, unions anticipate a less reduction in the real wages of
their competitors yielding wage aggressiveness.
The impact of CWS on employment will be tackled in the next section.
However the second part of Proposition 5 states that monetary policy is neutral
in the case of a single all-encompassing union (nH = 1) and when unions are
atomistic (nH ! 1). It is worth noticing that when nH ! 1 unions do not
perceive wage demands to have any impact on ination (sr = 0), and when
nH = 1 wage di¤erentials are ruled out. In both cases monetary neutrality
arises since unions perceive they can not a¤ect the real wages of the other
unions33 . The assumption of non-atomistic and uncoordinated wage setting is
hence crucial when wages are negotiated in nominal terms (Lippi, 2003).
32Similarly a wage increase is perceived by the i-th union to rise aggregate real wage (cal-
culated by taking account of the producer price index) which dampens its wage demands.
33The source of non-neutrality in policy games is analysed in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo
(2004).
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What about the Foreign monetary policy under a NMP regime? In Cuciniello
(2007) is shown that the CB abroad always counteracts domestic wage demands
by a restrictive monetary policy which triggers the depreciation of the domestic
exchange rate. This, in turn, boosts ination further dampening wage claims,
since a nominal wage increase ends in a real wage improvement to a lesser extent.
Thus, the higher is the Foreign CBC, the stronger is domestic wage restraint.
Nevertheless, if the domestic CB is ultra-populist or wage setters are atom-
istic, the Foreign CB impact on domestic wages fades away. This is because
the strategic interaction between CB and unions is broken and the (negative)
response of the CB abroad to a domestic wage hike is exactly o¤set by the (pos-
itive) response of the ultra-populist CB at Home or is perceived nil by atomistic
wage setters34 .
As to ination, equation (37) and (38) reveal the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) in the absence of di¤erent strategic e¤ects, i.e. U = N
and U = 

N , the ination rate under a NMP regime is always lower than in a
MU for a given level of employment. (ii) A higher degree of the CBC, , reduces
the ination bias (dcdc < 0).
Proof. The rst part of the proposition is immediately proved by observing
equation (37) and (38). For the second part, see equation (51).
The motive the shift to a MU raises ination is the di¤erent trade-o¤between
employment and ination faced by the common CB. Since the Phillips curve
in a MU is atter than under a NMP regime, the common CB has stronger
incentive to resort to surprise ination (Rogo¤, 1985b). Unions anticipate this
inationary inducement and strive to keep CB from modifying their real wages
which culminates in a higher inationary bias. In this respect, Proposition 6
explains why the ECB has a statute that is more conservative than the one of
the pre-MU Bundesbank considered the most conservative CB in Europe (Piga,
2000).
Contrary to Coricelli et al. (2004) where a higher degree of CBC is always as-
sociated with lower ination and unemployment, a more conservative CB in this
model does curb ination while reduces unemployment only if the adverse out-
put e¤ect is stronger than the adverse competition e¤ect. The di¤erent upshot
in Coricelli et al. (2004) is mainly due to the absence of labor substitutability
in the production function. Thus, the adverse output e¤ect always dominates
the adverse competition e¤ect and a more ination averse CB makes unions
perceive higher labor demand elasticity, which results in lower real wages.
Now according to Proposition 5, the impact of CBC on labor elasticity de-
pends on the predominance of the adverse output or the competition e¤ect.
Hence, employment will be an increasing function of CBC if the labor mar-
ket distortion are high. Since the adverse output e¤ect is always larger in a
MU relative to the adverse output e¤ect under a NMP regime, three cases are
feasible35 .
First, the adverse competition e¤ect may prevail in both regimes (Figure 1).
Employment is therefore a decreasing function of CBC and an ultra-populist
34When the domestic CB does not care about ination and wage setters are atomistic, the
labor demand elasticity is equal to .
35Analytically proved in the Appendix. As for the following simulation, we let nH = 3,
 = 1=2, k = 1 and  = 3=4.
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Figure 1: Employment and CBC when adverse competition e¤ect prevails in
both regimes. For values of  > b the common CB is conservative, while for
values of  < b is populist.
CB is the rst best for the economy in terms of employment. Note that, under
a NMP regime, an increase in Foreign CBC boosts employment in the Home
country by raising labor demand elasticity. However, employment level is un-
ambiguously higher in a MU when the CB is ination averse.
Second, the adverse competition e¤ect may prevail under a NMP regime but
not in a MU (Figure 2). In such a case labor market power is low at country
level but relatively relevant in the union-wide economy36 . This could be, for
instance, the situation of UK vis-à-vis the EMU where unions do not play a
key role in the domestic labor market and the national CB is liberal. An ultra-
populist CB maximizes employment under a NMP regime. However, if the CB is
ination averse, the move to the EMU unambiguously improves employment. In
other words, an ultra-populist CB under a NMP regime produces only a second
best result for UK since an ultra-conservative ECB might increase employment
further.
Finally, labor market distortions can be sizeable under both regimes (Fig-
ure 3) so that CBC always boosts employment. Note that an increase in the
Foreign CB boosts employment in the domestic country since it raises the labor
demand elasticity. However, there exists some "small" level of CBC associated
with a higher employment level under a NMP regime; indeed, with an ultra-
conservative CB, employment is unambiguously larger in a MU. The possibility
of higher labor demand elasticity under a NMP is due to the Foreign CB re-
strictive policy that in presence of a populist Home CB reinforces the discipline
e¤ect on wage settlement37 .
7.2 Role of centralization of wage setting
What is the e¤ect of the number of unions on employment and ination? Here
we tackle these questions holding constant the degree of CBC so as to focus
only on the degree of CWS.
36 It may be due to some sort of friction in labor mobility across countries, e.g. language
di¤erences, bureaucracy and legal barriers.
37The possibility that such a result arises is analytically derived in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Employment and CBC when adverse competition e¤ect prevails under
a NMP regime but not in a MU. For values of  < b the common CB is populist,
while for values of  > b is conservative.
Figure 3: Employment and CBC when adverse output e¤ect prevails in both
regimes. For values of  < b the common CB is populist, while for values of
 > b is conservative.
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From equations (34)-(38), union numerosity a¤ects employment and ina-
tion via the elasticity of labor demand, r. In particular, an increase in the
labor market elasticity, i.e. in the competitiveness of labor market structure,
diminishes both ination and unemployment.
Once again the adverse output and competition e¤ect play a fundamental
function in settling the impact of the CWS on macroeconomic outcomes as
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (i) For a given level of CBC, an increase (decrease) in the
CWS, smaller (larger) nH , reduces (raises) ination and raises (reduces) em-
ployment under a MU and a NMP regime if  < 11  and  <
k+F 
2
 c
kN+F F (1 ) ,
respectively; (ii) for a value of  = b such that the CB is neither conservative
or populist, the elasticity of labor demand is always larger in a MU than under
a NMP regime.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, a non-atomistic labor union sets a higher nominal wage for its
members as long as this does not reduce their employment, i.e. if its real aggre-
gate wage does not exceed the real aggregate wage38 . Thus, the smaller is the
number of unions, the more each union internalizes the inationary repercus-
sions of their wage claims (internalization e¤ect). On one side, the wage setter
expects a higher ination rate in the wake of an increase in nominal wage and,
hence, less consequences on the aggregate real wage and the aggregate labor
demand. This entails wage aggressiveness. On the other side, a higher level
of centralization lets union anticipate that its own wage demand nishes in a
higher aggregate nominal wage which, ceteris paribus, raises the real wage. This
second e¤ect discourages wage aggressiveness and is overwhelming if the condi-
tions in Proposition 7 hold, i.e. when monopoly distortions are high enough so
as to lead a large union to perceive an increase in its own nominal wage as a
raise in its real relative wage (Cavallari, 2004).
Now we assess graphically the three conceivable combinations of the adverse
output and competition e¤ect in the Home country. Since ination and employ-
ment are monotonic functions of labor demand elasticity, r, we focus on the
linkage between this key variable and CWS. In order to control for the CBC,
we assume that the CB is neither conservative nor populist39 .
When the adverse output e¤ect is larger than the adverse competition one,
monopoly distortions are relatively high and a more CWS lets unions internalize
the unemployment consequences of their wage demand through the CB reaction
function (see equation (39))40 . Under such circumstances, labor demand elas-
ticity is decreasing in the number of unions and converging to  in presence of
atomistic wage setters (as illustrated in Figure 4).
By contrast, if the adverse competition e¤ect is larger than the adverse
output one, a more decentralized wage setting renders unions relatively less
38When employment is below the Pareto-e¢ cient level, the welfare gain of a reduction in
employment is lower than the welfare loss of a reduced consumption.
39Note that the value of CBC for which HH and U are equal to zero is b =
k(k+F 
2
F )
(1 N )F (k+F F ) under a NMP regime and
b = k
(1 ) in a MU.
40Multinational rms, for instance, may indirectly promote international wage coordination
menacing to move the production where labor costs are lower (Calmfors, 2001).
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aware of their inationary wage settlement but increases the demand of rms
for cheaper labor. In such a case, a competition e¤ect would discourage wage
aggressiveness to a larger extent since by assumption is higher than the adverse
output (Figures 5).
Finally Figure 6 illustrates the case in which the adverse output e¤ect pre-
vails in a MU but not under a NMP regime. If the monetary unication induces
to higher centralization at the union-wide level, macroeconomic performance
improves.
Figure 4: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse output e¤ect
prevails and HH = U = 0.
The results in this section are in sharp contrast with the U-shaped curve à la
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988). In order to have the U-shaped relationship between
the CWS and economic performance three assumptions have to be satised41 :
(a) There exists a monotonic relation between the CWS and the internaliza-
tion e¤ect.
(b) An increase in CWS always reduces competition in the labor market.
(c) In a decentralized wage setting the competition e¤ect prevails on the inter-
nalization one, while under a centralized wage setting is the internalization
e¤ect to be dominant.
Condition (a) always holds in our model, while (b) is met only if the ad-
verse output e¤ect is smaller than the adverse competition one. The union is
labor demand elasticity with respect to its wage is an indicator of the degree of
competitiveness in the labor market: an elastic labor demand shrinks monopoly
power in the labor market. As said before, this elasticity can be increasing or
decreasing in the CWS. However, the third assumption (c) is never satised
since with atomistic wage setters (i.e. monopolistic competition, nH !1) the
labor demand elasticity converges to .
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Figure 5: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse competition
e¤ect prevails and HH = U = 0.
Figure 6: Labor demand elasticity and CWS when the adverse competition
e¤ect prevails under NMP regime but not in a MU with HH = U = 0.
Figure 7: Home employment, CBC and nH for  small.
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Figure 8: Home employment, CBC and nH for  large.
7.3 Interactions between central bank conservatism and
centralization of wage setting
Here we combine the e¤ect of CWS and CBC on employment and ination
relying on the results obtained in the previous sections. As for employment, the
upshots for the Home country in a MU are shown in Figure 7 and 842 .
When  is small, according to Proposition 5, employment is an increasing
function of CBC as in Figure 7. An ination averse CB is, actually, willing to
contract its money supply so as to create more unemployment in the economy
and reduce ination. Labor unions are aware of the unemployment threat arising
from a conservative CB and hold down their wage demands.
Moreover, for a given level of CBC, employment is always decreasing in the
number of unions which is inversely related to their degree of internalization.
With a single all-encompassing union, employment is maximized independently
of the monetary conservatism. In such a context, it is not necessary to carry out
a monetary contraction threat, for coordinated wage setters fully internalizes the
aggregate labor demand. Note that in the case of monopolistic competition, i.e.
when nH goes to innity, unions do not internalize at all the macroeconomic
impact of their wage claims on ination and the strategic interactions with the
CB is ruled out43 .
Conversely, in Figure 8 labor market distortions are less relevant and a higher
degree of CBC diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less con-
cerned about the aggregate unemployment consequences of their wage hikes,
they are tempted to set higher nominal wages which, in turn, increase their own
relative real wages. In this case a more conservative CB is particularly costly in
presence of very few unions. In fact, the less is the number of unions, the more
they internalize the real wage gain. For a given level of CBC, we see a sharp
monotonicity between employment and decentralization of the wage bargaining.
Only an ultra-populist CB may nullify the chance of achieving higher real
wages; indeed, when  = 0 the level of employment is equal to the rst best
regardless of the number of unions, so that the monotonic relationship between
41These conditions are pointed out in Guzzo and Velasco (1999).
42The graphics under a NMP regime reveal indeed similar behavioral patterns.
43The labor demand elasticity is in fact equal to .
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Figure 9: Home ination, CBC and nH for  small.
employment and the number of unions disappears. Furthermore, the decrease
in employment stemming from a greater monetary conservatism is dampened by
the number of unions (the grid becomes at for large nH). This conforms with
the results in the earlier sections, where CBC does not a¤ect labor elasticity as
nH !1.
Next we account for the joint e¤ect of the number of unions and CBC on
the rate of ination. The simulation is contained in Figure 9 and 10.
In both case ination is a decreasing function of the degree of CBC as we
expected. The main di¤erence is the role played by the CWS with di¤erent
degrees of . When labor market distortion are high, a lower number of unions
may reduce ination while it does not have any impact if substitutability among
labor types is substantial ( is high). This means that the e¤ect of CBC on
ination seems to be largest (smallest) at very high level of CWS if  is low
(high).
The reason why ination is not a¤ected by a large number of trade unions is
related to the internalization e¤ect. Atomistic wage setters (nH ! 1) do not
perceive to have any impact on ination (see equation (30)). A non-atomistic
union, instead, realizes that an increase in wage a¤ects positively ination trig-
gering the response of the CB. What is key to large unions, however, is that
monetary conservatism may inuence their monopolistic power. In Figure 9
they have high monopoly power and CBC reduces it by boosting the elasticity
of labor demand. By contrast, in Figure 10 monopoly power is low and CBC
increases it by diminishing the elasticity of labor demand.
Finally, drawing on the employment analysis, we can consider the joint e¤ect
of the number of unions and CBC on individual welfare. The welfare analysis
vis-à-vis labor market distortion is shown in Figure 11 and 12. The following
proposition summarizes the main results in terms of individual welfare.
Proposition 8 (i) A nationally centralized wage bargaining system maximizes
individual welfare if labor market distortion are sizeable. (ii) In presence of keen
competition in the labor market, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters
are optimal for the society. (iii) a MU is a welfare maximizing regime when
labor market distortions are not sizeable. (iv) a MU is a welfare maximizing
regime when labor market distortions are sizeable if nH = 1 or  is su¢ ciently
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Figure 10: Home ination, CBC and nH for  large.
Figure 11: Home welfare, CBC and nH for large .
large.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As long as the employment level is below the optimal one, a rise in employ-
ment is welfare augmenting. Hence, if labor market distortions are sizeable,
we know that the smaller is the number of the unions, the better is employ-
ment performance, and, consequently welfare (see Proposition 7). Conversely,
when  is large, the monopolistic competitive outcome is optimal and both an
ultra-populist CB and atomistic wage setters can replicate it.
As to the welfare e¤ect of a monetary unication. First, note that employ-
ment level and hence welfare are increasing functions of labor substitutability, .
As a matter of fact, the higher is the labor substitution, the higher is the labor
demand elasticity. Thus we know that labor markets with sizeable distortions
will perform worse, in terms of employment and welfare, than labor markets
where such distortions are lower or nil.
The comparison of welfare between the two regimes when  is large is con-
tained in Figure 11. The surface with a thicker mesh stands for the MU regime,
while the surface with a thinner mesh points out the NMP regime both with an
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Figure 12: Home welfare, CBC and nH for small .
ultra-populist and ultra-conservative foreign CB. It is apparent that the shift to
a MU is unambiguously welfare increasing if the CB cares about ination. In
this respect, the higher adverse output e¤ect in the MU vis-à-vis the NMP one
renders U more elastic than N for any value of  6= 0. By contrast, in the
case of ultra-populist CB, a move to a MU leaves welfare unchanged44 .
When labor market exhibits signicant monopoly distortions, labor demand
elasticity is positively associated with monetary conservatism. However, for
some small level of CBC, the elasticity of labor demand may be higher under
a NMP regime than in a MU. This result is in contrast with Cavallari (2004)
where a move to a MU always increases labor demand elasticity (and hence
welfare) when monopoly distortions are relevant.
Here as shown for instance in Figure 12 in presence of an ultra-conservative
Foreign CB, welfare under a NMP regime may exceed the MU one if the Home
CB is relatively populist. However, as we expected, a single monopoly union
leads to the rst best in both regimes45 and, for a su¢ ciently high level of CBC,
a MU becomes the second-best choice in presence of more than a trade union.
8 Conclusions
The creation of a monetary union (MU) may alter the incentives to reform
the labor market. This issue is particularly relevant in Europe where labor
markets are characterized by the presence of large trade unions and the impact
of domestic wages on the union-wide ination rate is diluted. Switching to a MU,
the monetary policy of the central bank (CB) is now addressed to union-wide
targets instead of country-specic ones which implies a new trade-o¤ between
ination and employment in setting its optimal policy.
Investigating the strategic impact of centralization in wage setting (CWS)
and CB conservatism (CBC) on economic performance, we nd in line with the
case of a oating exchange rate regime (Cuciniello, 2007) that the move towards
higher level of CWS and CBC may increase employment and reduce ination
44Remember both labor demand elasticity are equal to  with an ultra-populist CB.
45 In the Appendix it is proved that welfare in a fully centralized wage bargaining system is
always higher in a MU than under a NMP regime.
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in a MU if monopoly distortions in the labor market are signicant. In such a
case, a conservative CB is willing to contract money supply so as to create more
unemployment in the economy and control ination. Labor unions are aware of
the unemployment threat arising from a conservative CB and hold down their
wage demands. Since the number of unions is inversely related to their degree
of internalization of the monetary threat, more centralization will increase the
economic performance.
The comparison between the national monetary policy (NMP) regime and
the MU reveals that a move to a MU boosts ination in the absence of strate-
gic e¤ects. This is due to a atter Phillips curve faced by the common CB.
However, when strategic interactions between CB(s) and trade unions are taken
into account, the shift to a MU unambiguously increases welfare and employ-
ment when monopoly distortions are sizeable either in presence of a su¢ ciently
conservative CB or with fully CWS.
Conversely, when labor market distortions are less relevant, a higher degree
of CBC diminishes labor demand elasticity. Since unions are less concerned
about the aggregate unemployment consequences of their wage hikes, they are
tempted to set higher nominal wages which, in turn, increase their own relative
real wages. In this case a more conservative CB is particularly costly in presence
of very few unions. In fact, the less is the number of unions, the more they
internalize the real wage gain. As for the welfare analysis, the paper shows that
in presence of keen competition in the labor market, an ultra-populist CB or
atomistic wage setters are optimal for the society and a shift to a MU regime is
unambiguously welfare improving.
9 Appendix
Elasticities of money supply to nominal wages. Following Cuciniello
(2007) let H  1    and F  1   (1   ) be the slope of the Phillips
curve under a NMP regime in the Home and Foreign country respectively46 .
The elasticity of domestic money supply to local nominal wages is47
cc = 1 
c(k +  c
2
 c)c
k2 + c cc c(1  ) + k( c2 c + c2c)
; c 2 [H;F ] (43)
Since both domestic and Foreign CBC negatively a¤ects HH , it can range from
1 to   1  in the case of ultra-populist (when H ! 0) and ultra-conservative
(when H ! 1^ F ! 1) CB, respectively. The elasticity of money supply
to nominal wage abroad is instead given by48
 cc =  
 cc c(1  c)c
k2 + c cc c(1  ) + k( c2 c + c2c)
; c 2 [H;F ] : (44)
Thus the range of FH is   1  and 0 in presence of an ultra-conservative
(H !1^ F !1) and populist CB (H !1_ F !1) respectively. In
the case of a MU, the elasticity of money supply to union-wide wages is given
46These results are derived in Cuciniello (2007).
47Note that HH = FF only if  = 1=2 and H = F .
48Note that HF = FH only if  = 1=2.
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by
U = 1 
(1  )U
k + U (1  )2
whose range spanned by CBC is

  1  ; 1

: The impact of CBC on U is
dU
dU
=   k(1  )
[k + (1  )2U ]2
< 0:
A typical union rst order condition. The typical union i maximizes (15)
with respect to !i subject to (4) and (27), taking as given prots, Di; and the
nominal wages set by other unions at Home and abroad. Note that individual
union dividend ows are Di = PH YHn (1   ). In a symmetric equilibrium in
which all Di are the same, prot per union is
Di = PHYH(1  ) = (1  )PCi:
From the budget constraint (4), we obtain for all domestic rms
PCi =WiLi + (1  )PCi
so that PCi =WiLi. The rst order condition with respect to !i yields
(
d logWi
d!i
  d logP
d!i
+
d logLi
d!i
) + k logLi
d logLi
d!i
= 0 (45)
where we used 1Ci
dCi
d!i
= WiLiPCi
h
d logWi
d!i
  d logPd!i +
d logLi
d!i
i
and WiLiPCi = . Di-
viding expression (45) by d logWid!i  
d logP
d!i
and using the real wage elasticity
denition     d logLi
d log
Wi
P
yields equation (33).
Analysis of CBC and macroeconomic outcome. From equation (34) and
(35), it appears that the value of labor demand elasticity is mainly determined
by the elasticity of money supply to nominal wages. According to the degree of
CBC, the range of 1 HH is 0 and k+F 
2
F
(1 )F F+kN in the case of ultra-populist
and ultra-conservative CB respectively. Similarly 1  U is equal to 0 and 11 
in presence of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB respectively. When
1  HH = 0 and 1  U = 0, i.e. in presence of an ultra-liberal domestic CB,
the elasticity of labor demand is  in both regimes. When the CB is ultra-
conservative, instead, the labor demand elasticities are49
lim
!1
N =
1
nH
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
+

1  1
nH

; (46)
lim
!1
U =
1
nH
1
1   +

1  1
nH

: (47)
These relations prove equation (40), (42) and (41). In general, the sign of dNd
not only depends on the adverse output and competition e¤ect but also on the
other CBC as follows:
dN
d
=
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F )N

k + F 
2
F   (kN + F F (1  ))

k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2 : (48)
49Note that
k+F 
2
F
(1 )F F+kN <
1
1  :
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The sign of dNd is hence
sign

k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
  

:
The sign of dNdF is instead always positive:
dN
dF
=
k(1  F )F (1  N )N [k(nH   1) + nHN ]
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2 > 0: (49)
In the case of a MU the sign of
dU
d
=
k(nH   1)(1  ) [1  (1  )]
[k(nH   1) + nH(1  )2]2
(50)
is given by
sign

1
1     

:
The rst part of Proposition 5 is proved by taking the partial derivative of (36),
(37) and (38) with respect to CBC and using equation (48) and (50) as follows:
dl
d
=

k
1
2r
dr
d
d
d
=   
rr
2

1 +

r
dr
d

< 0: (51)
Notice that the term in brackets in equation (51) is always positive since
 r drd  <
1: The adverse output e¤ect under a NMP regime is an increasing function of
F and is always smaller than the adverse output in a MU,
1
1  . Now what
remains to assess is whether the labor demand elasticity in MU and NMP inter-
sect in the (; r) plane. As a matter of fact, the NMP and MU labor demand
elasticity coincide when  = 0 and the latter is larger than the former when
 ! 1. Thus it is su¢ cient to analyze if the slope of dNd evaluated at  = 0
is greater than dUd evaluated at  = 0. The impact of CBC on money supply
elasticity in both regimes at  = 0 is
dU
d

=0
=
(1  )(1  (1  ))
k(n  1) (52)
and 
dN
d

=0
=
H

k + F 
2
F   (kH + F F (1  ))

k(n  1)(k + F 2F )
: (53)
Note, rst, that expression (53) is an increasing function of F . When  >
1
1 
the ratio h
dN
d
i
=0^F=0h
dU
d
i
=0
=
1     (1  )2
1    (1  )2 > 1 (54)
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which implies that there not exists a level of  6= 0 where the labor demand
elasticity N and U are equal. When  <
1
1  the expression (54) holds i¤
 < 11 +1  . In such a case there exists a level of  6= 0 where the labor
demand elasticity N and U intersect. The second part of Proposition 5 is
achieved by evaluating equation (48) at nH = 1 and nH !1.
Analysis of CSW and macroeconomic outcome. The marginal impact
on labor elasticity of a more decentralized wage setting is
dN
dnH
=

(kN + F F (1  ))   (k + F 2F )

Z2
k(nH   1)(k + F 2F ) + nH(F NF (1  ) + k2N )
2
where Z2  N

k2 + FNF (1  ) + k(F 2F + 2N )

> 0 and the sign of
N depends on the
sign

   k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )

By the same token, the derivative of the labor demand elasticity with respect
to unions numerosity is
dU
dn
=
( 1 + U ) [1  (1  )]
[n+ ( 1 + U )  U ]2
and the sign is determined by the
sign

   1
1  

which proves Proposition 7. Interestingly, both labor elasticity tends to  in
presence of atomistic wage setting (i.e. nH ! 1). In order to compare the
e¤ect of CWS in the two regimes and get rid of the impact of domestic CBC,
we assume in section 7.2 that the CB is neither conservative nor populist, i.e.
we evaluate the labor demand elasticity when U = HH = 0 which yields
[U ]=bU = (n  1)   1n   (55)
and
[N ]=bH =
 
k + F 
2
F

[1 + (nH   1)]
F F (nHF   1 + N ) + k(nH   1 + N )
(56)
where bH = k(k+F 2F )(1 N )F (k+F F ) and bU = k(1 ) : There is no value of nH
belonging to the relevant domain in which the elasticity (55) and (56) cross
each other50 . The expression (55) evaluated at nH = 1 yields
[U ]U=bU^n=1 = 11  : (57)
Note that expression (56) is an increasing function of foreign CB hence we
evaluate it when F !1 as follows:
[N ]H=bH^n=1^F!1 = F1  : (58)
50Such a value is in fact n =  1

:
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It is apparent that expression (57) is always larger than (58).which proves Propo-
sition 7.
Welfare and macroeconomic institutions. It is straightforward to com-
pute that welfare level as follows:
Ui =
1
2
2
k

1  1
r

2 

1  1
r

=
1
2
2
k

1  1
2r

: (59)
Now consider the problem of maximizing the individual welfare on the constraint
set as follows:
max
nH ;
Ui (60)
s:to nH  1 ^   0:
The solution of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions yields
if  >
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
,  = 0 ^ nH > 1
if  <
k + F 
2
F
kN + F F (1  )
,  > 0 ^ nH = 1:
If we evaluate the (59) at the nH = 1 and  = 0, we obtain
[Ui;N ]nH=1 =
2
2k
2641  1
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 )
2
375 ; (61)
[Ui;U ]nH=1 =
2
2k
2641  1
1
1 
2
375 (62)
and
[Ui;N ]=0 = [Ui;U ]=0 =
2
2k

1  1
2

: (63)
It is apparent that expression (61) is greater (smaller) than expression (63) i¤
 <
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) ( >
k+F 
2
F
kN+F F (1 ) ). Similarly expression (62) is greater
(smaller) than expression (63) i¤  < 11  ( >
1
1  ). Moreover relation (62)
is always larger than relation (61). Recall that both an ultra-populist CB and
atomistic wage setters lead the labor demand elasticity to be equal to , i.e. the
case of monopolistic competition.
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